(b) Section 103(1) of this Act (driving whilst disqualified), or (c) Section 143 of this Act (using a motor vehicle while uninsured or unsecured against third party risks).
At trial, the Recorder of Swansea had told the jury that they had to be sure that the defendant's driving of his car was a cause of the pedestrian's death. The jury had then asked whether, if they considered that the deceased's stepping into the road was the principal, main or major cause, should that influence their consideration of the defendant's driving as also being a cause? The judge answered that the deceased's action in stepping into the road would not exclude another true cause. On appeal, the Crown accepted that there was a principle that the result of a defendant's act normally had to be attributable to a culpable or blameworthy act. However, for the purposes of s. 3ZB, Parliament must have intended to dispense with this requirement. The Court of Appeal first considered whether it was Parliament's intention to depart from this general principle in enacting this offence. The court noted (at [20] ) that the Road Traffic Act 1988 (as amended) contained other provisions relating to causing death by driving: causing death by dangerous driving (s. 1), causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs (s. 3A), and causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving (s. 2B). Furthermore, in relation to the latter offence, s. 3ZA defines 'careless and inconsiderate driving' as follows:
(2) A person is to be regarded as driving without due care and attention if (and only if) the way in which he drives falls below what would be expected of a competent or careful driver ... The fact that this offence of careless and inconsiderate driving specifies a low level of fault weighed heavily with the Court of Appeal which concluded (at [19] ) that if the offence under s. 3ZB 'were to be interpreted to require any blameworthy conduct, bearing in mind the very wide scope of the offence of causing death by careless and inconsiderate driving, it is difficult to see what purpose the offence could have ... To hold that blameworthy conduct was required would be to re-write s._3ZB'. Thomas LJ applied the approach of the Court of Appeal in R v Marsh [1997] 1 Cr App R 67, where the court had held that fault in relation to injury arising or damage caused was not required on a charge of aggravated vehicle-taking under s. 12(A)(1) of the Theft Act 1968.
The second issue for the court in the present case was whether it was sufficient for the appellant's driving to be a cause of the death. The trial judge had directed the jury that if they found that the appellant's driving was a cause which was not minimal, then he was guilty of the offence. Defence counsel's second argument was that the judge had erred; Parliament must have intended that the driving had to be a major or substantial cause. Thomas LJ (at [22] ) applied the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in R v Hennigan (1971) 55 Cr App R 262, a case of causing death by dangerous driving. With regard to the issue of causation, Lord Parker CJ had observed in that case that '[t]he Court would like to emphasise that there is nothing in the statute which requires the manner of the driving to be a substantial cause, or a major cause, or any other description of cause, of the accident. So long as the dangerous driving is a cause and something more than de minimis, the statute operates'. Defence counsel's submission that the appellant's conduct did not 'cause' the death in the ordinary sense of the word, the absence of a licence and insurance playing no part in the occurrence of the accident, was unsuccessful. The court considered the general explanation of causation provided in Chapter 5(9), para. England and Wales, Law Com. Report No. 177 (1989) . The draft Criminal Code had suggested that the definition of causation for a result crime included doing 'an act which makes a more than negligible contribution to its occurrence' at 17(1). This definition had sparked debate with the effect that the Law Commission decided to look again at the issue of a definition of 'causation', and its 2003 draft report proposed replacing the Code's 'more than negligible' with 'significant', after reviewing case law.
The Court of Appeal then reviewed authorities referred to in the Law Commission's 2003 draft report (at [31] ), concluding that 'it is not always possible to deal with the issue by the use of "significant" or "substantial"' (at in the context of the other offences where death results from driving ... it is difficult to conceive of any other intention of Parliament that if a person drove unlicensed or uninsured, he would be liable for death that was caused by his driving however much the victim might be at fault; it was therefore sufficient that the cause was not negligible. It may be a harsh and punitive measure with an evident deterrent element, but it is difficult to see how anything else can have been intended.
The court rejected including any reference to 'significant' or 'substantial' by the judge to a jury in a case such as this as the terms could be easily misunderstood (at [36] ). Given the academic criticism of this offence on the ground that it is objectionable in principle, it is important that a jury clearly understands that what is required is that a cause was more than minute or negligible.
